



Why an Emissions Trading System?

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Domestic Emissions Trading (ETS)**

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Topics

- **Remarkable diversity of ETS systems**
- **Why Trading?**
- **What is a cap?**
- **Technical and political conditions**
- **Lessons learned**

A Remarkable Set of Examples

- Kyoto Protocol: The correct global vision
- EU ETS: The pioneer and multi-state prototype
- RGGI (Northeastern US states)
 - Truly volunteer multi-state effort (7 + 3 -1)
 - An auctioning path-breaker?
- New Zealand
 - Pioneering integration of land use into trading
 - No explicit cap; regulatory obligation, free NZUs & linkage
- California
 - Only clear legislative mandate in US
 - Revealing allocation and off-set debates
- Australia
 - Can agree on price and switch from tax to ET
- And one failure: US federal program
 - Good proposal, but bad politics (tactics and allocation)

Why Trading?

- The Grand Reasons
 - Ability to differentiate without sacrificing efficiency
 - Easier to propagate globally
- What are the alternatives?
 - Tax: For all the theoretical advocacy, rarely chosen
 - Default is always conventional regulation (“command & control”)
 - Subsidy a rising but fatally flawed contender
- Specifically,
 - EU ETS: Salvaging Kyoto after US withdrawal
 - RGGI: Building on NOx Program success
 - NZ: Full embrace of Kyoto logic; also ITQs
 - CA: Price of bipartisan support (Schwarzenegger)
 - Australia: The notable exception, but why not continue?
 - US (federal): Perceived presence of regulatory alternative detracted from political commitment

What is a cap?

- Classic formulation: The aggregate limit on emissions
 - Determines allowances to be distributed to firms
- Typically an absolute quantity, but not necessarily
 - Could be an intensity-based cap, adjusted for GDP
 - Given expected GDP, any cap implies an intensity target
 - Cap can vary by realized GDP to achieve given intensity
- NZ is interesting example of no explicit cap
 - Embedded in global system: NZUs and AAUs
- Offsets adjust local cap while preserving global effect
 - Also reduces cost...enabling tighter cap?
 - More importantly, propagates abatement & trading
 - Projects can be seen as mini-ETS's
 - Not clear than offset limits are needed; just integrity

Technical Conditions

- Measurement (aka MRV)
 - Trading and taxes presume fairly exact measurability
 - Variety of measurement techniques: upstream vs. downstream, material balance or emissions monitoring approaches; all feasible & used
 - Cost and administrative feasibility are main criteria
 - Key determinant of coverage and phasing
- Accounting and data handling capability
 - Closely related to measurement
 - Going beyond visual inspection of “command and control”
- Enforcement
 - Common to all alternatives, including standard regulation
 - Non-fuzzy, binary nature of surrender obligation should help
 - Basic governance capability; goes with development & emissions
- Institutional framework
 - “Market institutions” are not hard to develop

Political Conditions

- Perception of leadership
 - EU ETS, RGGI, Calif, and (possibly) NZ see selves as leaders in climate policy
 - Leadership rarely if ever invoked in failed US federal debate
- Maintaining broad bipartisan consensus
 - No partisan opposition in EU; only interest groups
 - Bipartisan collaboration in RGGI and California; & in earlier cap-&-trade
 - Notably lacking for CO₂ at US federal level. But, Australia also?
- Providing expertise and education
 - Impressive stake-holder processes in EU, RGGI, and Calif
 - Committed expertise avoids political blunders
- Avoiding allocation battles
 - Largely avoided through delegation in EU ETS & RGGI
 - Important cause of disagreement & failure in US federal proposal
 - California is the exception

Lessons Learned

- Political feasibility is the big issue, not technical feasibility
 - Politics is local, depending on personalities, right moment, etc.
 - Technical conditions are necessary, but not sufficient
 - Educating stake-holders and building expertise prepares the way and promotes understanding
- Phasing in and trial periods seem order of the day
 - Phasing in usually dictated by measurement and politics
 - Trial or warm-up periods educate, work out problems, and build confidence
 - Relatively modest near-term ambition prevails; all that is required now
- Free allocation: Relax, everybody does it!
 - Free allocation compensates & facilitates political agreement on a cap
 - But no need to be a perpetuity; EU ETS got it about right
 - RGGI is the notable exception; but now a de facto tax
 - Objective is a price on carbon; not raising revenue



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Thank you very much for your attention

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