De-risking investment & Climate auctions

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vivideconomics
Trillions in investment are needed to achieve NDC targets

A 2°C pathway requires $3.3 trillion, $700 billion more than under BAU.

**Developing nations** could require two-thirds of global low-carbon investment.

Achieving the NDCs of just 21 emerging nations requires annual investment of US$ 1.6 trillion over 2016-2030.
Results-based climate finance to facilitate the private sector response to environmental pricing

Source: adapted from World Bank & Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, "Results-Based Climate Finance in Practice: Delivering Climate Finance for Low-Carbon Development", (2017).
Climate auctions can facilitate the transition from climate finance to markets, implying transitional reliance on public funds.
Price guarantees designs interact differently with markets and tradability maximises chances of successful delivery.
Discussion – how to de-risk investment

- Where have price guarantees and/or results-based climate finance (RBCF) worked for you?
  - Which sector, technology?
- What are different implementation modalities (how prices were determined, whether it was a top up or other form)?
  - How successful were they?
- Was other support (technical assistance etc.) needed to overcome additional barriers?
  - What was the role of it?
Climate auctions can cost-effectively deliver climate outcomes and may be useful in helping countries achieve their NDCs.

Climate auctions consist of **three key elements** (World Bank, 2017)

1. **products** that are sold are **(tradeable) price guarantees for climate outcomes** (e.g. CO$_{2}$e reductions, kWh savings, or kWh generated) backed by public funds

2. **price formation**: the price paid for the guarantee/the guarantee’s future price is determined by an **auction format**, whereby bidders compete to own contracts

3. **risk-sharing** is ensured as the owner of the price guarantee can only receive financing upon **third party verification of the climate outcome**
Climate outcomes must satisfy three criteria to be suitable for auctions.

Features of climate outcome opportunity:

- Suitable for auctions if:
  - Information asymmetry between government and firms
  - Sufficient number of bidders
  - Funder concern is cost-efficiency

- Suitable for price guarantee if:
  - Cost viability gap
  - Uncertain future demand

- Suitable for results-based payments if:
  - Effective MRV
  - Financial capacity
  - Institutional capacity

Funding requirements:

1. Leverage
2. Extend
3. Fill Gaps
Climate auctions can help reach NDC targets through three transition models

**Leveraging** the power of price signals
— to achieve additional climate outcomes from existing market-based instruments, untapped by current prices

**Extending** the reach of price signals
— to achieve climate outcomes from areas not currently covered by market-based instruments but where there is a near-term expectation that this can change

**Gap filling** to achieve discrete non-market policy objectives
— to deliver climate outcomes identified in NDCs where no market can yet function
Bringing it together – and where climate auctions can be used in the future

Broader regulatory and NDC context
Climate auctions act as transitional climate policies through three modalities:

1. Leverage
Additional climate outcomes from existing market instruments

Features of the climate outcome opportunity

- Suitable for auctions
- Suitable for price guarantee
- Suitable for results-based payments

2. Extend
The reach of existing market instruments into new areas

3. Fill Gaps
To target discrete climate outcomes outside the scope of markets

Funding requirements
Discussion – climate auctions to transition toward carbon pricing

- What has been your experience with similar mechanisms?
- Previous work identified areas where auctions are suitable: what do you think are the sectors and policies in your country where climate auctions could be used?
  - Sectors you want to cover that are not (currently) covered by policy instruments
- How do you feel about using climate auctions to help transition towards carbon pricing instruments?