Communications as a science

16 – 20 November 2020

Asia regional workshop on Zoom

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Learning objectives

- Understand the importance of communications
- Understand the evidence and core principles of communications
- Understand the research methodology for developing communications

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Content

1 Why is it important to communicate carbon pricing?

2 The scientific basis of climate communications.

3 Guiding principles for communicating carbon pricing

4 Developing a research program

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Why is it important to communicate carbon pricing?

Improve policy design	Help generate sustainable support	Anticipate opposition
• Valuable feedback through interactions between policymakers and stakeholders	• Explaining reasons for carbon pricing, how it works and why it is desirable • Make key stakeholders supportive advocates	• Testing messages with different audiences

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

To ensure that a policy will be supported by the public and sustained across governments

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Climate Change communications is a science

- Based on research evidence
- Analysis by university academics
- Published in peer-reviewed journals
- International debate and challenge
- Multi-disciplined- psychology, social research, statistics
- Tested across multiple media

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Oxford Encyclopaedia of Climate Change Communications

3 Volumes
115 chapters
200 contributors
2424 pages
$500



Advice to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Climate change is *understood* and *believed* as a socially constructed narrative conveyed by trusted communicators that reflects their identity and validates their values.



WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

A Budescu, D.V., Por, H. & Broomell, S.B. (2012). Effective communication of uncertainty in the IPCC reports. Climatic Change, 113 (2), 181 – 200. **Climate Change Communications Advisory Group (CCCAG)** (2010). Communicating Climate Change to Mass Public Audiences. Available from: http://publicinterest.org.uk/downloads/ **Corner, A.** (2013). Climate Silence (and how to break it). Oxford: Climate Outreach and Information Network (COIN). **Corner, A., Markowitz, E. and Pidgeon, N.F.** (2014). Public engagement with climate change: the role of human values. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5 (Issue 3), 411-422. **Fisher, W.R.** (1984). Narration as Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument. Communication Monographs, 51, 1-22. **Harris, A.J.L., Corner, A., Xu, J. & Du, X.** (2013). Lost in translation? Interpretations of the probability phrases used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in China and the UK. Climatic Change, 121, 415-425. **IPCC** (2014). History. Available from: ttp://www.ipcc.ch/organization/ organization_history.shtml **InterAcademy Council** (2010). Climate Change Assessments: Review of the processes and procedures of the IPCC. Available from: http:// reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net **IPCC** (2012). Communication Strategy. Available from: http://www.ipcc.ch/ meetings/session35/IAC_CommunicationStrategy.pdf **Kahan, D.M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., Larrimore Ouellette, L., Braman, D. & Mandel, G.** (2012). The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks. Nature Climate Change, 2, 732– 735 **Lewandowsky, S., Gignac, G.E. & Vaughan, S.** (2013). The pivotal role of perceived scientific consensus in acceptance of science. Nature Climate Change, 3, 399 – 404. **McGrath, M.** (2014). Climate inaction catastrophic – US. Available from: http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-26824943. **Patt, A.G. and Weber, E.U.** (2014). Perceptions and communication strategies for the many uncertainties relevant for climate policy. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5, 219–232. **Pidgeon, N. & Fischoff, B.** (2011). The role of social and decision sciences in communicating uncertain climate risks. Nature Climate Change, 1, 35 – 41 **Dimdins, G., Sandgren, M. & Montgomery, H. (2014)** Psychological mechanisms underlying political orientations in an old and a new democracy: **Special Eurobarometer 300** (September, 2008). *Europeans' attitudes towards climate change*. TNS Opinion & Social, European Commission. **Mair, P.** (2007). Left-Right Orientations in Dalton. R. (Ed) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. **Scruggs, L.** (2012) Declining public concern about climate change: Can we blame the great recession? *Global Environmental Change* 22(2), 505–515. **Engels, A., Hüther, O., häfer, M.S., & Held, H.** (2013). Public climate-change skepticism, energy preferences and political participation. *Global Environmental Change* 23, 1018-1027. In German. **Painter, J. & Ashe, T.** (2012). Cross-national comparison of the presence of climate scepticism the print media in six countries, 2007–10. *Environmental Research Letters* 7. **Whitmarsh, L.** (2011). Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: dimensions, determinants and change over time. *Global Environmental Change* 21, 690–700. **Holm, A., K.** (2013) A Typical Norwegian Climate Sceptic. *Weekend*, 07 June. Available at: http://www.vl.no/2.627/typisk-norsk-%C3%A5-v%C3%A6reklimaskeptisk- 1.48198 **Corner, A., Markowitz, E. & Pidgeon, N** (2014). Public engagement with climate change: the role of human values iley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 3, 411-422; **Van der Linden, S**. (2015). The social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions: Towards a comprehensive model. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 41, 112-124. **Schwartz, S.H.** (199 *niversals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries*. United Kingdom: Academic Press, Inc. **Corner, A. J., Markowitz, E. and Pidgeon, N.F.** (2014). Public engagement with climate change: the role of human value *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 5(3,)411-422*. **Allen, P. & Chatterton, T.** (2013). Carbon reduction scenarios for 2050: An explorative analysis of public preferences. *Energy Policy* doi.org/10.1016/ j.enpol.2013.08.079 **References Bickerstaff, K., Lorenzoni, I., Pidgeon, N.F., Poortinga, W. & Simmons, P.** (2008). Reframing nuclear power in the UK energy debate: nuclear power, climate change mitigation and radioactive waste. *Public Understanding Science*, 17, 145-169. **Bolderdijk, J.W., Steg, L., Geller, E.S., Lehman, P.K. & Postmes, T.** (2013). Comparing the effectiveness of monetary versus moral motives in environmental campaigning. *Nature Climate Change*, 3, (413-416). **Brulle, R.J., Carmichael, J., Jenkins, C.** (2012). Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the U.S., 2002–2010. *Climatic Change* 114,169-188. **Capstick, S. et al** (in press). Social science prospects for radical emissions reduction. *Carbon Management*. **Capstick, S.B. & Pidgeon, N.F.** (2013). What is climate change scepticism? Examination of the concept using a mixed methods study of the UK public. *Global Environmental Change*, 24, 389-401. **Capstick, S. and Pidgeon, N.F.** (2014). Public perception of cold weather events as evidence for and against climate change. *Climatic Change*, 122, 695-708. **Chilton, P.** (2012). Communicating bigger-than-self problems to extrinsicallyoriented audiences. PIRC. **Chitnis, M., Sorrell, S., Druckman, A., Firth, S.K. & Jackson, R.** (2013). Turning light into flights: Estimating direct and indirect rebounds effect for UK households. *Energy Policy*, 55, 234-250. **Corner, A.** (2013). *A new conversation with the centre-right about climate change: Values, frames and narratives*. Oxford: Climate Outreach & Information Network. **Corner, A.** (2013) *Climate Silence (and how to break it)*. Oxford: Climate Outreach & Information Network. **Corner, A.J., Markowitz, E. and Pidgeon, N.F.** (2014). Public engagement with climate change: the role of human values. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, n/a. **rner, A.J. & Randall, A.** (2011). Selling climate change? The limitations of social marketing as a strategy for climate change public engagement. *Global Environmental Change*, 21(3), 1005-1014. 31 DECC Energy System campaign: Scoping project June 2014 **Corner, A & Roberts, O.** (2014). *How narrative workshops informed a national climate change campaign.* Oxford: Climate Outreach & Information Network. **Corner, A.J., Venables, D., Spence, A., Poortinga, W., Demski, C.C. & Pidgeon, N. F.** (2011). Nuclear power, climate change and energy security: Exploring British public attitudes. *Energy Policy*, 39(9), 4823-4833. **Corner, A.J., Whitmarsh, L.E. & Xenias, D.** (2012). Uncertainty, scepticism and attitudes towards climate change: biased assimilation and attitude polarisation. *Climatic Change*, 114(3-4), 463-478. **Crompton, T.** (2010). *Common Cause: The Case for Working with our Cultural Values*. United Kingdom: WWF. **DECC** (2014a). DECC Public Attitudes Tracker survey. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/306911/ technical_note_to_accompany_pat_datasets.pdf **DECC** (2014b). Community Energy Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/275163/20140126Community_Energy_Strategy.pdf **Demski, C., Spence, A. & Pidgeon, N.** (2013). Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability — Summary Findings of a rvey Conducted in August 2012. London: UK Energy Research Centre. **Devine-Wright, P.** (2011). Public engagement with large-scale renewable energy: breaking the NIMBY cycle. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 2, 19-26. **Devine-Wright, P.** Explaini 'NIMBY' objections to a power line: The role of personal, place attachment and project-related factors. *Environment and Behavior*, in press. **Dietz, T., Stern, P.C. & Dan, A.** (2009). How deliberation affects stated willingness to pay for mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions: an experiment. *Land Econ*, 85,329–347. **Dietz, T.** (2013). Bringing Values and Deliberation to Science Communication. *Proc Natl Acad Sci*, doi. 110:14081–14087. **ERP** (2014). *Engaging the public in the transformation of the energy system*. United Kingdom ERP. **Evans, L., Gregory, R.M., Corner, A., Hodgetts, J. Ahmed, S. & Hahn, U.** (2013). Self-interest and pro-environmental behaviour. *Nature Climate Change*, 3, 122-125. **Herman, D.** (2013). *Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences*. USA: Center for the Study of Language and Information. 32 DECC Energy System campaign: Scoping project June 2014 **Hine, D. et al** (2014). Audience segmentation and climate change communication: conceptual and methodological considerations. WIREs Climate Change doi: 10.1002/wcc.279 **Jasanoff, S.** (2010). A New Climate for Society. Theory, Culture & Society, 27 (2-3), 233-253. **Jones, M. & Song, G.** (2013). Making Sense of Climate Change: How Story Frames Shape Cognition. *Political Psychology* doi: 10.1111/pops.12057 **Kahan, D.M. & Braman, D.** 006). Cultural cognition and public policy. *Yale Law & Policy Review*, 24(1), 149–172. **Kahan, D.M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M. & Slovic, P. Ouellette, L.L., Braman, D. & Madel, G.** (2012). The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Chan sks. *Nature Climate Change*, 2, 732-735. **Lorenzoni, I. & Pidgeon, N.F.** (2006). Public Views on Climate Change: European and USA Perspectives. *Climatic Change*, 77(1-2), 73-95. **Maibach, E. et al** (2009). Global warming's Six Americas 2009: An Audience Segmentati Analysis. **Maio, G.R.** (2011). Don't mind the gap between values and action. Discussion Paper. Common Cause. Retrieved from http://valuesandframes.org/download/ briefings/Value-Action%20Gap%20|%20Common%20Cause%20Briefing.pdf **Marshall, G.** (2014). *ter The Floods: Communicating Climate Change Around Extreme Weather*. Climate Outreach Information Network, Oxford. **Middlemiss, L. & Parrish, B.D.** (2009). Building capacity for low-carbon communities: The role of grassroots initiatives. *Energy Policy*, 38, 755 7566. **Mocker, V.** (2012). "Blue valuing Green": Are intrinsic value frames better than economic arguments to communicate climate change and transport policies to Conservative audiences? Oxford University: Unpublished Masters Dissertation. **Nilsson, A., von Borgstede, C. & Biel, A.** (2004). Willingness to accept climate change strategies: The effect of values and norms. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 24, 267-277. **Nye, M., Whitmarsh, L. & Foxon, T.** (2010). Socio-psychological perspectives on the active roles of domestic actors in transition to a lower carbon electricity economy. *Environment & Planning A*, 42(3), 697-714. **Painter, J.** (2011). Poles Apart - The International Reporting of Climate Scepticism. Oxford, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of

What is the difference between communications and propaganda?

Communications	Propaganda
***Communicare*- to share**	***Propagare – to spread***
Informing	**Persuading**
Two-way process	**One-way**
Open to feedback	**Feedback not allowed**

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Evidence-based principles for carbon pricing communications

Values-driven	**Broad-based**
Early and sustained	**Trusted**
Seen to work	**Tested**
Consistent	**Two-way**
Simple	**No magic words**

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Communications should start in the early stages of policy design

The concerns of citizens and stakeholders should inform the design of the policy **from the very beginning**.

The choice of policy, especially between carbon tax and ETS should be informed by citizen and stakeholder attitudes.

The name of the policy may be very important and should be chosen carefully.

Integrating communications with policy

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research

Image credit: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research

Quantitative research

- Surveys
- Polls

<>

Qualitative research

- Interviews
- Focus groups

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research: best practice

Survey: identify attitudes and the key target audiences.

Focus groups: recruit from the identified target audiences, explore their attitudes and responses, and test alternative forms of communications.

Survey: test messages derived from the focus groups.

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research: audience segmentation

- Find out how attitudes are distributed across the population
- Identify distinct audiences holding similar positions

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

The four segments

Base	Opponents	Swing	Disengaged
Supportive of carbon pricing and action on climate change	Rejecting carbon pricing and climate action	Moderate but weak support but open to change	Not expressing interest or opinions on the topics.

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research: commissioning research

- Marketing agency
- University social research unit
- Internal government or departmental research unit
- External experts and consultants
- Leveraging/desk review or existing academic research

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research: questions to ask

1. General attitudes

- Public attitudes on climate change
- Attitudes to related issues (such as air pollution)
- Attitudes towards the government
- Levels of trust – and who they trust

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research: questions to ask

2. Specific carbon pricing questions

- Do people understand how a carbon price works?
- What are their responses to the proposed policy?
- How might it best be named?
- What are the responses to different test narratives?
- What are the responses to different uses of the revenues?

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Case Study: Colombia

Colombia: Research 2019-2020

- Two focus groups (representative sample)
- National survey (door-to-door, 15 mins, 1,200 people)
- 25 interviews across government
- 5 days desk research

Cost:	Focus groups	$1,750 each
	Survey	$12,000

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Colombia: findings

Audiences: Environmental concern highest with 18-24 year olds. Lower support for ETS with older conservatives. Greatest differences are regional not demographic.

Concerns: air pollution, employment, agriculture, climate change, distrustful of government.

Identity: Nature, Environment, entrepreneurial, hardworking, not frightened of change, wanting to contribute to global issues

Proud of forests, nature, agriculture, food

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Colombia: outputs

Advice for policy formation and revenue use

A name and brand for the policy
Core and sub narratives for different audiences
Training for government communicators

Brochure
Standard presentations
Social media postings
2 videos
2 podcasts

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Research: a low-cost approach

Structured interviews

Double-up on other research

Draw on existing networks

Incorporate into stakeholder engagement

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS

Questions?

WORLD BANK GROUP

pmr | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET READINESS