




# **Crediting mechanisms beyond 2020**

Partnership for Market Readiness

London, 12-13 March 2015

Lambert Schneider

# Key factors impacting the role of crediting



# Crediting programmes: lessons learned

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- **Benefits:**

- Identification of untapped mitigation opportunities
- Lower GHG abatement costs
- Tool for climate finance & technology transfer
- Co-benefits for sustainable development
- Capacity building & awareness raising
- International cooperation

- **Challenges:**

- Integrity: Additionality, baselines, perverse incentives, overlap with other policies, information asymmetry
- Transaction costs
- Adverse impacts: social & environmental safeguards
- Reaching dispersed sectors and less developed countries

# Crediting programmes: at what level?

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- **Projects / Programmes**
  - + Proven concept
  - + Direct incentive and price signal for GHG emitters
- **Sectors**
  - Difficult to set price signal / incentives for GHG emitters
  - + Large-scale reductions
- **Policies (e.g. NAMAs)**
  - Additionality of policy decisions?
  - Quantifying emission impacts could be challenging
  - + Large-scale reductions

# Demand for credits


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- **International demand by countries**
  - EU, US: Focus on domestic reductions
  - Switzerland, Norway: Significant use of crediting
- **Compliance with ETS**
  - Focus on domestic credits (US, China, South Korea)
- **Compliance with carbon taxes**
  - Mexico, South Africa, others
- **Results-based finance**
  - Pilot Auctioning Facility (PAF)
  - Climate Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev)
  - Green Climate Fund?
- **Mechanisms for aviation and maritime emissions**
- **Voluntary offsetting**

# Domestic framework

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
- **Increasing proportion of emissions covered by ETS**
  - Less potential for supply
  - Possibly more demand
- **Large proportion of emissions could fall within scope of INDCs**
  - Double counting risks
  - CDM type => JI type mechanisms?
  - Incentives for countries to ensure integrity under ambitious INDCs
- **Other policies may address the same emissions (feed-in tariffs)**



Source: ICAP

# Domestic crediting: experience from JI

Share of national GHG emissions claimed to be reduced through JI



# Intl framework for crediting **beyond 2020**

		<u>Within</u> the scope of <del>Kyoto targets</del> <b>INDCs</b>	<u>Outside</u> the scope of <del>Kyoto targets</del> <b>INDCs</b>
<b>Compliance market</b>	<b>International unit transfer</b>	<b>JJ</b> <b>JCM/BOCM (Japan)?</b> <b>NMM?</b>	<b>CDM</b> <b>JCM/BOCM (Japan)?</b> <b>NMM?</b>
	<b>Domestic use of units</b>	<b>JJ</b> <b>CAR (California)</b> <b>CCERs (China)?</b> <b>CDM, VCS, GS CCBA (South Africa)?</b>	<b>CCERs (China)?</b> <b>CDM, VCS, GS CCBA (South Africa)?</b>
<b>Voluntary market</b>		<b>VCS?</b> <b>GS VERs?</b>	<b>VCS</b> <b>GS VERs</b>




# Accounting challenges for post-2020 crediting (1)

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- **Risk of double counting of emission reductions by:**
  - Host country in achieving its INDC
  - User of the credit
- **Consequences of not preventing double counting:**
  - Disincentive to use international carbon markets
  - Comparability of pledges
  - Credibility of the climate regime
  - Increased global GHG emissions and abatement costs
- **Diversity of INDCs pose challenges for identifying and preventing double counting**
  - Economy-wide / sectoral
  - Other metrics than GHG emission budgets

# Accounting challenges for post-2020 crediting (2)

- **Conditionality of INDCs**
  - Purchasing and using credits by industrialized countries does not support developing countries if double counting should be avoided
- **Single-year targets not compatible with unit transfer**



# A possible post-2020 crediting world (1)

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- **A fragmented market**
  - Several crediting mechanisms
  - Several demand sources with own restrictions / priorities
- **Increasing role of ETS**
  - Large coverage
  - Less uncertainty surrounding emission reductions
  - Over-allocation serious risk
- **80% of global emissions within scope of INDCs?**
  - International transfers mostly “trading” – not crediting
  - Domestic crediting gaining importance, but limited supply

# A possible post-2020 crediting world (2)

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- **International crediting limited and depending on:**
  - Political willingness of buyers
  - Buyer INDCs expressed as multi-year emission budgets
  - International accounting rules
  - Integrity and transaction costs of crediting mechanisms
- **Results-based finance important tool**
  - Promising to support developing countries in their INDCs
  - No double counting risks as units are cancelled
  - Less concerns surrounding additionality, baselines, etc
- **Other demand sources**
  - International aviation / shipping
  - Voluntary offsetting

# A long-term vision on intl carbon markets

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- **A comprehensive UNFCCC accounting framework for international transfer of mitigation outcomes**
  - Transferring mitigation outcomes within the scope of INDCs
  - International oversight on using credits from mitigation outcomes outside the scope of INDCs
- **A UN mechanism for crediting emission reductions**
  - International / domestic crediting, results-based finance
- **ETS / carbon taxes main carbon pricing instruments**
- **Support to developing countries through**
  - Using tax / auctioning revenues for (results-based) finance
  - Net financial flows through international linking of ETS
  - Crediting mainly in countries / sectors without INDCs



**Thank you for your attention!**

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